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Introduction
The essay below was prepared in March to discuss the 
contrast between the globalization that we need to fight 
Covid-19 and the reality of rising geopolitical tensions as 
the U.S. increasingly turns its back on multilateralism.  Since 
then, events have accelerated, and not for the good.  The 
world is even more unstable in June than it was in March. 
Since then, the U.S. has failed to contain the epidemic at 
home, with deaths rising to more than 100,000 and the 
virus continuing to spread within the U.S.  The Trump 
Administration doubled down on its attack on the global 
system by announcing the withdrawal from the World 
Health Organization, ostensibly as a kind of punishment 
for WHO relations with China, but really out of the 
stark unilateralism of the Trump Administration.  The 
economic situation has worsened dramatically in the U.S., 
with unemployment reaching 20 percent, and all of this 
likely to intensify in the midst of social turmoil following 
the brazen killing of several African-Americans and the 
unrest that has followed.  In short, we find ourselves in the 
U.S. in an epidemic, a depression, a geopolitical conflict, 
and a period of deep social instability.  This is certainly 
the worst U.S. crisis in nearly one hundred years, since 
the Great Depression.  What is more, the country is very 
deeply divided on how to respond. 
 In this moment, it is crucial to keep our eye on our 
long-term goals and principles, as guideposts for escaping 
from a downward spiral of unrest, disease, and economic 
collapse.  The United States at its best is about diversity, with 
people of all ethnicities, countries of origin, cultures, and 
religions, forging common efforts for the common good. 
New York City at its best is the world’s leading exemplar of 
that unity in diversity.  Throughout American history, the 
truth of diversity has confronted the ugly reality of racism 
and exclusion.  We face that challenge again today. 
 Similarly, the US at its best is about cooperation with 
the world, building institutions and efforts for a world 
that shares peace and prosperity.  Yet at its worst, the US 
is about extreme chauvinism, overthrowing governments, 
inciting conflicts, and even instigating wars of choice with 
devastating consequences.  Again, we are at a crossroads. 
Will the U.S. cooperate with China and other countries 
as it must do to secure its own wellbeing and the world’s, 
or will it deepen conflicts unnecessarily, in some naïve 
attempt to gain the upper hand against China?
 The future hangs in the balance, more urgently than we 
might have imagined just a few months ago.  The Covid-19 
epidemic continues to surge in many parts of the world, 
the US included.  The world economy will suffer its largest 
downturn since the 1930s.  Many environmental crises, 
such as destruction of the rainforests, actually accelerate 
at the moment because conservation efforts, regulations, 
and enforcement are withdrawn.  And while greenhouse 
gas emissions have been reduced temporarily by the very 
deep contraction of the world economy, some countries 
will be tempted to build back through fossil fuels rather 
than renewable energy, as the path of least resistance and 
greatest lobbying pressure. 
 All of this means that we must redouble our efforts 
to choose a path out of this crisis built on public health, 
sustainable development, and most importantly, the 
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common good and global cooperation. The first and most 
urgent step is public health: to contain the pandemic 
everywhere in the world. This should be done through 
intensified public-health efforts, including testing and 
quarantining infected individuals, physical distancing, 
and safe workplace practices. Global cooperation to 
support the WHO is vital; the US withdrawal from WHO 
should be condemned and reversed.  The second urgent 
step is financial, logistical, and humanitarian support, 
for the hardest-hit regions and most vulnerable peoples 
on the planet.  This requires greatly stepped up financial 
backing for the world’s poor countries in the form of 
grants, loans, and debt relief.  The third urgent step is a 
global, cooperative effort to build a new global economy 
that is socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable, 
using the framework of the Sustainable Development 
Goals, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.  The European Union is adopting 
a Green Deal for Europe.  This should be combined with 
a Green New Deal in the United States, a sustainable Belt 
and Road Initiative in China, and similar steps in other 
regions, such as an ASEAN Green Deal and an African 
Union Green Deal.  By cooperating globally across the 
world’s major regions, and keeping our eye on the core 
concepts of sustainable development, we have the real 
possibility, and the vital need, to turn the current crisis 
into the first steps of a sustainable and inclusive path for 
the world.
Hegemonic Stability
In his remarkable account of the Great Depression, the 
late and great economic historian Charles Kindleberger 
famously argued that the Great Depression occurred 
because there was no world leader to step in with effective 
solutions, and the League of Nations was not up to the 
task. The United Kingdom had been the world leader until 
the Great War but emerged from that devastating war in 
debt to America and with deep and chronic economic 
problems. The United States was by far the world’s largest 
economy in the Interwar period, but America was not yet 
prepared for global leadership. Only the experience of 
World War II thrust the United States into active global 
leadership. 
Thus, when the crisis of the Great Depression hit 
America starting in 1929—after a decade of political and 
financial instability in Europe—the United States viewed 
the crisis almost entirely in domestic terms rather than as 
the global crisis that it soon became. The Great Depression 
represented first and foremost a misfiring of the gold 
standard, compounded by the war debts and repara-
tions payments imposed after World War I. Global-scale 
cooperation during 1930-2, led by the treasuries and 
the central banks of the major economies (the U.S., UK, 
France, and others), might well have salvaged the global 
economy without massive loss of output. No such cooper-
ation arose.  By 1933, Hitler was in power. The depression 
lasted until 1939, when Germany dragged Europe into its 
second conflagration in as many decades. 
Kindleberger’s theory came to be known as Hegemonic 
Stability Theory—the idea that a dominant power, or 
hegemon, was needed to provide global public goods such 
as financial stability. The world of the 1930s was between 
hegemons, so to speak, with the baton not yet handed 
off from London to Washington, which would occur 
only in the 1940s. The world suffered years of disarray 
as each individual country entertained inward-looking 
policies, and often “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies such 
as tariffs became the norm—meaning that “solutions” in 
one country merely shifted even greater losses to other 
countries. 
After World War II, the United States became the new 
hegemon, albeit one that faced off against the Soviet bloc 
in the Cold War. America also led the establishment of 
global institutions, notably the United Nations, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank), the rule-based 
open trading system, various specialized UN agencies, and 
other multilateral institutions. The United States helped to 
fund the West’s postwar recovery through the Marshall 
Plan and helped to launch an era of development aid. 
Much of this was narrowly self-interested, especially 
geared to promote America economic interests; much was 
in direct competition with the Soviet Union; and much 
was truly instituted with a view towards avoiding global 
conflicts and creating a more peaceful and prosperous 
world. Moreover, much was disastrously wrongheaded, 
such as the Vietnam War. Through the period from the 
1940s to the 1980s, narrow American self-interest and 
global idealism were both at play in U.S. foreign policy, and 
American policies varied between inspiring (creating the 
UN system), insidious (repeated CIA-led regime-change 
operations), and downright destructive and incompetent 
(U.S.-led or U.S.-supported wars in Southeast Asia, Latin 
America, and the Middle East).  
Waning U.S. Leadership
After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 
1991, the United States thought it could go its own way 
without investing much in the international system. After 
all, with the end of the Soviet Union, America viewed itself 
as even more powerful and even more exceptional than 
during the Cold War. 
Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development
DOI: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 
Consilience J. Sus. Dev. 2020, 22, 1-53
A quintessential example of this way of thinking was 
a statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright in 1998: “if we have to use force, it is because we 
are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand 
tall and we see further than other countries into the future, 
and we see the danger here to all of us.”
Yet in fact the United States was already weakened as a 
global leader and American blunders and ignorance accel-
erated the decline of U.S. leadership. 
The main reason for the decline in American predom-
inance was simply the declining share of the United States 
in the world economy. The American share of planetary 
economic output, measured in purchasing-power-ad-
justed prices, declined from 27 percent of global GDP in 
1950 to 19 percent in 2008 (according to estimates by the 
late Angus Maddison, another great economic historian), 
and to just 15 percent in 2019 (according to the IMF). But 
the United States accentuated the decline by launching 
or participating in several disastrous wars in Afghani-
stan (starting in 1979 and continuing off and on until the 
present), Central America (in the 1980s), Iraq (1990 and 
again in 2003), Syria, Libya, and elsewhere, that cost vast 
numbers of lives and trillions of dollars of wasted spending. 
On top of this, much of America’s political establish-
ment came to believe naively that leadership through 
war and regime change could substitute effectively for 
leadership through diplomacy, compromise, and devel-
opment finance. The United States would get its way 
because of its unrivaled military power, not because it was 
providing public goods and increasing global wellbeing. 
The United States increasingly refused to sign UN 
treaties and protocols. The U.S. Senate, for example, after 
ratifying the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 1992 then refused to implement the treaty. 
America absented itself from countless other inter-
national agreements and treaties over the past three 
decades, including the International Criminal Court, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Law of 
the Sea—just to name three. 
American leaders willfully ignored the judgments of 
the UN Security Council, such as when President George 
W. Bush went to war in Iraq in 2003 after failing to win 
its backing. Along with turning its back on UN treaties, 
the United States also became more and more resistant to 
development aid and cooperation on global tax reform. 
America would go its own way—the rest of the world be 
damned. 
Rogue State 
Under U.S. President Donald Trump, America has 
abandoned any semblance of being the world’s leader of the 
multilateral order.  The United States has become, instead, 
a sort of rogue state, with a direct assault on many interna-
tional agreements (including the US withdrawal from the 
Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Climate Agreement), and 
the imposition of unilateral trade and sanction policies at 
variance with international law and international rules. 
In terms of values, Trump boasts of “America first,” rather 
than the world together.  
The United States remains a very powerful country 
economically and technologically, but it is no longer 
the predominant economic or technological power. The 
European Union and China are roughly the same size 
economically as America, and the spread of digital tech-
nologies is worldwide. The United States is by far the most 
powerful military country in the world, though it finds out 
war after war that the US military can solve no political 
problems whatsoever. America has around 6,000 nuclear 
warheads, 800 military bases around the world, and many 
wars.  
It bears repeating: under Trump and his nationalist 
doctrine of America First, the U.S. has become a sort of 
rogue state, rejecting the constraints of the UN Charter and 
global treaties.  In both speech and deed, Trump evinces 
overt hostility towards the rest of the world, including 
many ostensible allies, and overtly rejects the values of 
multilateralism that the US supported for decades. 
The historical record clearly shows that Trump has 
blocked virtually every multilateral initiative of recent 
years. The United States is the only country pulling out of 
the Paris Climate Agreement. It is the only country that 
pulled out of the Iran nuclear agreement. 
Moreover, it’s a misnomer to speak of a China-U.S. 
trade war; there is a U.S. trade war on China. That is 
quite different. This “trade war” was an unpremeditated 
American attack because of China’s rise in technological 
capacity. Have no doubt about it: the U.S. attacks on 
Huawei, ZTE, and others is because the United States 
realizes that China is gaining massive technological 
capability in artificial intelligence and other security-re-
lated areas. 
Yes, China is making massive gains because China is 
home to vastly talented and well-educated people, and is 
minting hundreds of thousands of PhDs every year. That’s 
how the world works—and how it should work. There is 
no monopoly of knowledge; there’s no monopoly of talent. 
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This is driving Trump and American right-wing 
nationalists to distraction because America’s grand strategy 
is based on American dominance—or “primacy,” to use 
the language of geopolitics. And that’s not some fantasy 
of mine, this is in countless American foreign policy and 
defense documents and doctrines. There can be no U.S. 
primacy in the world anymore that is safe for the world. 
That’s not how the world works anymore. But that is how 
American policy still works. 
The United States under Trump is also attacking the 
global taxation of online activities. America has made 
disastrous cuts to corporate taxation, which is deeply 
undermining the worldwide taxation on companies. In 
addition, the United States has tried to dismember the 
WTO by killing the appellate process. 
Moreover, the Trump Administration now claims that 
it’s going to adjudicate exchange rates and put unilateral 
tariffs against countries that America alone deems to be 
manipulating the exchange rate. Well, I know the U.S. 
Treasury, and with all due respect, that venerable insti-
tution does not have an honest view in this. The claims 
of “currency manipulation” are political—top to bottom. 
Such claims have nothing to do with anything merito-
rious; they are all about some temporary “advantage” in 
some geopolitical contest. 
In January 2020, when Iraq said it wanted American 
military forces to leave the country, if you can imagine, the 
U.S. Treasury basically said: “we’ll confiscate your foreign 
exchange reserves at the New York Fed if you persist in 
pushing our troops out.” This is a kind of thuggery. It is 
a complete violation of the international rule of law. Yet 
this is what we are facing with the United States as a sort 
of rogue state. I’m sorry to say it—it’s my country, I’m not 
very happy to say it—but the United States is a resentful 
imperial power in decline. 
America is a dangerous country right now, and it 
will absolutely become more dangerous if Trump wins 
reelection.
COVID-19 and Multilateralism
The world has therefore reached another “Kindle-
berger Moment.” The world is bereft of global leadership 
and shared solutions. No single state or overarching 
alliance of states is willing or able to provide global public 
goods. When the going gets tough, no one group by itself 
can provide stability—financial or political. That’s what 
the world look like before COVID-19. And that’s what it 
looks like now, too. 
With the emergence of the COVID-19 epidemic we 
face a global calamity with no hegemonic power, and with 
gravely weakened global cooperation. The world is falling 
into depression with the United States playing America 
First politics. Even worse, Trump’s game-plan is to try to 
blame China for the epidemic. 
The facts are these. The COVID-19 virus emerged in 
China just as HIV emerged in West Africa, MERS emerged 
in the Arabian Peninsula in 2012, Zika emerged in Africa 
and spread to South America, and H1N1 emerged in 
Mexico in 2010 and was greatly amplified in the United 
States before becoming global. 
In short, emerging infectious disease emerge in all 
parts of the world, generally as zoonotic events (a shift of 
the pathogen from an animal reservoir to humans)—from 
bats to humans, in the case of COVID-19. 
The United States wants to blame China, and the 
Republican Party has now made blaming China a core 
part of its 2020 electoral strategy. This action has been 
taken mostly to cover-up Trump’s complete and shocking 
incompetence in confronting the epidemic, but it is also 
an instrument to continue Trump’s war on China, trying 
to blame China for the epidemic and thereby promoting 
U.S. primacy over China. Indeed, American election-year 
politics is rapidly descending into an abyss of nationalist 
emotions, with Trump’s rival, former Vice President Joe 
Biden, attacking Trump for being too soft on China! 
These attacks on China would merely constitute part of 
the internal politics of an American election year but for 
the fact that they are quickly spreading to the international 
arena. Not only is there no global leader; the United States 
is actively trying to undermine the international system in 
the belief that multilateralism is a hindrance to Trump’s 
anti-China strategy. 
Thus, Trump has done the seemingly unimaginable: 
cutting off American funding to the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) in the middle of the pandemic on 
the ostensible grounds that it is too pro-Chinese! One 
wouldn’t believe this in a work of fiction, much less as the 
real actions of a major power in the midst of a full-blown 
global epidemic and economic emergency.
World output is plummeting as nation after nation goes 
into lockdown to try to slow the spread of the virus. The 
IMF projects a decline in world output of several percent 
of global GDP—the gravest decline in economic activity 
since World War II. Yet it could become far worse. 
On Kindleberger’s reasoning, the global downturn 
could turn into a full-fledged depression, with no country 
or group of countries exercising the leadership to pull the 
world out of the downturn. And in one important way, 
the situation is even more precarious than in the 1930s. 
Back then, neither London nor Washington took the lead. 
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Today, the United States is in direct and active opposition 
to the multilateral order. It dangerously seeks a U.S.-led 
world order to replace the UN-centered multilateral 
system, but even in that regard it is unwilling to invest 
other than militarily in any kind of global order. 
Our Best Hope: Effective Multilateralism
With the world falling into depression, and the United 
States actively threatening the UN-based order (because 
it includes China), we find ourselves in one of the most 
dangerous periods in modern history. 
The good news is that the vast majority of the world 
would like to continue—and indeed to strengthen—
the global UN-centered order. The bad news is that 
the European Union may prove to be too weak and too 
disunited to be much of a bulwark against Trump’s actions, 
and indeed some governments in Western Europe (for 
example, Boris Johnson’s government in the UK, but 
probably some EU governments as well) will instinc-
tively follow the United States, since America remains the 
leader of NATO, the defense alliance of these countries. 
The right-wing governments of Australia, Brazil, Israel, 
and others will also follow Trump’s lead. The good news 
is that more and more European leaders are recognizing 
the need for a strong, united European Union that defends 
the multilateral system rather than following Trump’s 
dangerous unilateralism.
What will save us from ourselves, if we are to be 
saved, is this. The vast majority of the world will agree to 
strengthen WHO, rather than weaken it as the US wants. 
WHO would provide the vital logistics and material supply 
chains to fight the pandemic, as well as the organizational 
global leadership in the search for a COVID-19 vaccine. 
The IMF, another vital creation of the US at the end of 
World War II, would provide the emergency financing to 
low-income and emerging economies to keep them afloat. 
The Paris Club of creditor nations, plus China, would grant 
deep debt relief to heavily indebted developing countries 
that are battling the epidemic and the economic collapse. 
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), together 
with the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(OCHA), would protect the world’s food supply chains 
and ensure emergency food assistance to guard against 
mass hunger—a real prospect now on the horizon. 
I would therefore amend Kindleberger’s thesis in one 
vital way. As Kindleberger rightly noted, it is hard to fight 
a global crisis without a leader. The hegemon of the recent 
past is a hegemon no more. Yet our aim should not be to 
promote a new hegemon to replace the United States. We 
should not seek any single country or region to step into 
the gap. 
Our goal instead should be to replace American 
leadership or hegemony by an effective multilateral system 
operating under the UN Charter, our global foundation 
for peace; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the world’s moral charter; the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, our covenant for protecting the 
planet; and the Convention on Biological Diversity, our 
binding pledge to preserve all life against the damages that 
humanity is causing. 
Defending, protecting, preserving, and supporting the 
multilateral system should be the imperative of our times. 
Unilateralism is countered not by more unilateralism but 
by multilateralism; not by enmity but by cooperation. 
That should be the goal: global cooperation—urgently—to 
overcome the greatest challenge to humanity of modern 
times. This must become our abiding purpose. 
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